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Loan-to-value ratio as a macroprudential tool – 
Hong Kong SAR’s experience and cross-country evidence 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
I. Introduction 
The 2008–09 global financial crisis has demonstrated that monetary policy and 
microprudential banking regulations by themselves are not sufficient to prevent the build-up 
of systemic risk.
1 There is a growing consensus that macroprudential policy should 
complement the existing policy frameworks of central banks and supervisory authorities 
designed to address systemic risk (Bank of England (2009), Caruana (2010b), Jordan 
(2010), Papademos (2010) and Strauss-Kahn (2010)). Some countries – for example, 
Hungary, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – are considering adopting, or have 
recently adopted, maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios on mortgages (henceforth referred to 
as LTV policy) as a macroprudential instrument to fill the policy gap.
2 
Despite wider recognition in the policy community of the effectiveness of LTV policy, 
empirical evidence with regard to the following key issues remains scant.
3 First, how effective 
is LTV policy in reducing systemic risk generated by boom-and-bust cycles in property 
markets? Second, does LTV policy create significant liquidity constraints for potential 
homebuyers, some of whom might not qualify for a mortgage after making the sizeable down 
payment required under LTV policy despite their ability to repay the loan itself (see Financial 
Services Authority (2009))? Third, can a mortgage insurance programme (MIP)
4 offset this 
drawback of LTV policy, allowing banks to offer mortgage loans with LTV ratios higher than 
the maximum threshold without incurring additional credit risk? Or do MIPs reduce the 
effectiveness of LTV policy?  
The objective of this note is to provide empirical evidence based, in part, on Hong Kong 
SAR’s experience with both LTV policy and MIPs
5 and, in part, on econometric analysis of 
panel data from 13 economies. In Section II, we discuss the history of LTV policy in Hong 
Kong, presenting strong evidence that it has helped the Hong Kong banking sector weather 
the boom-and-bust cycles of the property market during the past two decades. We also 
present evidence that Hong Kong’s MIP has helped homebuyers overcome the liquidity 
                                                  
1  According to Caruana (2010a), systemic risk is the risk of disruption to financial services that occurs because 
of the impairment of all or part of the financial system and which can have serious negative consequences for 
the real economy. 
2  Hungary, Norway and Sweden have recently adopted LTV policies (see Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2010), Norges 
Bank (2010), and Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (2010)). The UK Financial Services Authority 
(2009) has not ruled out the possibility to employ such a policy in the future. 
3   The practice of LTV policy across countries, and the role of LTV policy in mitigating the amplification of credit-asset 
price cycles and in protecting banks from the disruptive effects of the cycles, are discussed in Borio et al (2001).  
4  Throughout this study, the term MIP refers to insurance that aims to protect lenders against losses due to 
mortgage payment default by borrowers. In some jurisdictions, it is known as lenders mortgage insurance.  
5  Hong Kong’s experience in this area – its LTV policy has been in effect for nearly 20 years; property prices in 
Hong Kong are subject to frequent and substantial swings; and Hong Kong banks have significant exposure to 
property-related lending – offers an unparalleled opportunity to assess the long-run prudential effect of LTV policy 
on banking stability. In addition, since Hong Kong is precluded from exercising an independent monetary policy 
under the Linked Exchange Rate System, LTV policy plays a predominant role in safeguarding banking stability. 164  BIS Papers No 57
 
constraints they may experience because of LTV policy without increasing the banking 
system’s exposure to credit risk. The policy implications are discussed in the conclusion. 
As shown in Annex A, econometric analysis of panel data from 13 economies bears out 
Hong Kong’s experience with LTV policy and MIPs. It shows that LTV policy enhances 
banking stability, mainly by reducing the responsiveness of mortgage default risk to property 
price shocks, and that MIPs have not reduced the effectiveness of LTV policy. 
II.  A brief history of LTV policy and the MIP in Hong Kong 
LTV policy has long played a vital role in safeguarding banking stability in Hong Kong. It was 
developed because of the special characteristics of Hong Kong’s financial system. First, 
residential mortgage lending (RML) has always been one of the largest areas of risk 
exposure for Hong Kong banks. Since 1991, RML has accounted for at least 20% of the 
banking sector’s lending to local borrowers, reaching a peak of 37% in September 2002. 
Second, property prices have historically exhibited strong cyclical patterns that could 
seriously threaten banking stability if bank exposure to the property market were not properly 
managed. In fact, Gerlach and Peng (2005) find that bank lending in Hong Kong is driven 
largely by property price movements,
6 suggesting that systemic risk is, to a great extent, 
associated with developments in the property market. Third, since the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) is precluded from conducting an independent monetary policy under the 
Linked Exchange Rate System, it must devise alternative policies for managing the systemic 
risk stemming from banks’ exposures to property markets. LTV policy was introduced as an 
instrument for strengthening the banking system's resilience to asset price volatilities and 
reducing the risk of cycle amplification through bank credit, rather than as a means of 
managing asset price cycles and market activities or targeting asset prices. 
 
                                                  
6  Gerlach and Peng (2005) conduct Granger causality tests for property prices and bank lending in Hong Kong. 
They find that property prices Granger-cause bank lending but not the other way around.   




LTV policy, property prices and mortgage delinquency ratio 
in Hong Kong SAR  
 
PV = property value 
Source: HKMA. 
 
Graph 1 provides a succinct visual summary of the developments in Hong Kong’s LTV policy, 
together with changes in property prices and mortgage delinquency ratios. The development 
of LTV policy in Hong Kong can be broadly divided into four phases, as summarised below: 
Phase 1: before 1997 
Prior to the adoption of the LTV policy in 1991, Authorized Institutions (AIs)
7 in Hong Kong 
were allowed to grant mortgage loans covering up to 90% of the purchase price or the 
market value of a property (whichever was lower) under the Third Schedule of the Banking 
Ordinance, the legal framework for banking supervision in Hong Kong. In view of the 
systemic risk that could arise from RML, the Commissioner of Banking had intended to 
amend the Third Schedule to lower the 90% LTV threshold to 70% and issued a guideline 
advising banks to adopt a 70% LTV ratio for RML. The Commissioner of Banking consulted 
the banks during 1991 on these intentions.  Banks were very co-operative, offering to adopt 
the 70% LTV policy voluntarily, removing the need to amend the Third Schedule.
8 The 70% 
maximum ratio has since been fully endorsed by the Hong Kong Government as a prudential 
measure and has evolved into a banking industry standard intended to guard against 
overexposure to the property market. On 2 November 1995, the Hong Kong Government 
                                                  
7  AIs are institutions authorised under the Banking Ordinance to carry on the business of taking deposits. All AIs 
in Hong Kong are supervised by the HKMA.  
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confirmed at a Legislative Council meeting that the 70% LTV ratio should be adopted as a 
long-term regulatory policy. 
Phase 2: from 1997 to 1999 
Against the backdrop of a sharp rise in residential property prices in 1996, signs of 
speculative activities (particularly at the upper end of the property market) and the rapid 
increase in RML,
9 the HKMA issued guidelines to all AIs on 28 January 1997 recommending 
the adoption of a maximum LTV ratio of 60% for properties with a value of more than 
HK$ 12 million – so-called luxury properties. 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong’s property prices fell significantly – by 
more than 40% from September 1997 to September 1998 – yet the mortgage delinquency 
ratio remained below 1.43%, which is low by international standards. This fact alone 
suggests that LTV policy reduces the credit risk faced by banks and assures the quality of 
banks’ mortgage loan portfolios. 
Phase 3: from 1999 to 2008 
After the Hong Kong Government implemented measures intended to stabilise the property 
market, the HKMA abandoned the 60% LTV ratio for luxury properties in October 2001 and 
restored the maximum LTV ratio of 70%. At the same time, the HKMA allowed AIs to 
refinance the mortgage loans of homeowners with negative equity for up to 100% of the 
current market value of the mortgaged property. Notwithstanding this relaxation of the rules, 
the HKMA emphasised that the 70% LTV policy remained generally appropriate as a long-
term prudential measure. 
Because household income also declined significantly after the Asian financial crisis, 
prospective homebuyers faced significant obstacles in the housing market, which led to calls 
for the relaxation of the 70% LTV policy. In 1999, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
(HKMC)
10 launched an MIP aimed at promoting wider home ownership. Under the MIP, 
mortgage loans of up to an LTV ratio of 90% were made available to homebuyers meeting 
certain eligibility criteria.
11 The MIP is designed to protect participating banks against credit 
losses on the portion of loans that exceeds the 70% threshold in the event of default by 
mortgagors. At the same time, it avoids the potential drawback of LTV policy: that some 
homebuyers may not qualify for a mortgage because of substantial down payment 
requirements even if they are able to make their mortgage payments. The increase in the 
number of homebuyers participating in the MIP during this period demonstrates that the MIP 
has helped a significant number of households overcome liquidity constraints (Graph 2) and 
that concerns about liquidity constraints should not be lightly dismissed. And, just as 
important, in assisting homebuyers the MIP has helped the banking sector avoid incurring 
additional credit risk. 
 
                                                  
9  Property prices in Hong Kong increased by 30%, RML by 21%, between December 1995 and December 
1996. 
10  The HKMC, which is owned by the Hong Kong Government, was established in 1997. Its primary missions 
are: (1) enhancing the stability of the banking sector by serving as a reliable source of liquidity, thereby 
reducing the concentration and liquidity risk of mortgage lending by banks; (2) promoting wider home 
ownership; and (3)  facilitating the growth and development of the debt securities and mortgage-backed 
securities markets in Hong Kong.  
11  The criteria include maximum levels for the debt-to-income ratio, loan amounts and maturities.   
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One concern is that the MIP may reduce the effectiveness of LTV policy because it enables 
households to increase their leverage ratios, thereby boosting the risk of mortgage defaults, 
in theory, and hence of bank credit losses. In reality, however, the HKMC’s MIP portfolio 
enjoys a lower delinquency ratio than Hong Kong’s banking sector,
12 indicating that, thanks 
to prudent underwriting criteria, the MIP has not undermined the LTV policy but has actually 
improved the stability of Hong Kong’s banking system. 
Phase 4: 2009 to the present 
As a result of strong capital inflows and unusually low interest rates amid unprecedented 
quantitative easing by major central banks since early 2009, property prices in Hong Kong 
have increased sharply, particularly at the upper end of the property market. As a prudential 
measure, the HKMA issued guidelines in October 2009 requiring all AIs to reduce the 
maximum LTV ratio for properties with a value of HK$ 20 million or more from 70% to 60%. 
In August 2010, to further safeguard banking stability and help banks manage credit risk 
                                                  
12  The delinquency ratio of the HKMC’s MIP portfolio reached a historical high of 0.39% at the end of September 
2003, whereas the ratio for the Hong Kong banking sector was 1.05%. 168  BIS Papers No 57
 
more prudentially, the HKMA applied the maximum LTV ratio of 60% to properties with a 
value of at least HK$ 12 million as well as to properties that are not owner-occupied. 
To strengthen risk management in the banking sector’s RML business, the HKMA 
implemented the following measures on 19 November 2010: (1) it lowered the maximum LTV 
ratio for properties with a value of at least HK$ 12 million from 60% to 50%; (2) it lowered the 
maximum LTV ratio for residential properties with a value between HK$ 8 million and 
HK$ 12 million from 70% to 60%, while capping the maximum loan amount at HK$ 6 million; 
(3) it kept the maximum LTV ratio at 70% for residential properties valued at less than 
HK$ 8 million but capped the maximum loan amount at HK$ 4.8 million; and (4) it lowered 
the maximum LTV ratio for all non-owner-occupied residential properties, company-owned 
properties, and industrial and commercial properties to 50%, regardless of their market 
value. 
Since 1994, Hong Kong has also implemented other policies with macroprudential elements, 
for example limiting the AIs’ exposure to property markets and setting maximum debt 
servicing ratios
13 for mortgage applicants. Details can be found in Annex B. 
III. Conclusion 
This note assesses some of the most important issues surrounding the use of LTV policy as 
a macroprudential tool, including its effectiveness and potential drawbacks. Hong Kong’s 
experience in this area, and the empirical findings of the econometric analysis of the panel 
data, suggest that LTV policy is effective in reducing systemic risk associated with boom-
and-bust cycles in property markets. Although the significant number of homebuyers 
participating in Hong Kong’s MIP indicates that LTV policy can lead to liquidity constraints for 
some households, empirical evidence shows that the MIP can mitigate this drawback without 
undermining the effectiveness of LTV ratios as a policy tool. Thus MIPs play an important 
role in enhancing the net benefits of LTV policy. More importantly, potential liquidity 
constraints should not be considered a compelling reason for not adopting an LTV policy to 
contain the systemic risk associated with property price shocks.  
                                                  
13  The debt servicing ratio is defined as monthly repayment obligations as a percentage of monthly income.  




An econometric analysis of the effect of 
LTV policy on banking stability 
Empirical specifications 
In this annex, we analyse panel data from 13 economies – Australia, Canada, Greece, Hong 
Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom and the United States – using two econometric models. Model A is specified 
to examine the effectiveness of LTV policy by estimating the responsiveness of mortgage 
delinquency ratios to changes in property prices and to macroeconomic fluctuations in two 
groups of economies – one with, and the other without, LTV policies. Model B examines 
whether MIPs have reduced the effectiveness of LTV policy. 
Model A: 
The following fixed-effects model is used to examine the effectiveness of LTV policy: 
t i i t i t i
i NLTV t i i LTV t i
i NLTV t i i LTV t i t i
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   (1) 
where i and t index the economy and time, respectively.    NLTV LTV I I  is a dummy variable for 
economies with (without) LTV policies. The specification assumes that changes in the 
mortgage delinquency ratio ( MD  )
14 for economy i at time t are correlated with percentage 
changes in real property prices ( P  ) and real GDP growth ( GDP  ). The ratio of aggregate 
mortgage debt to GDP (DTGDP) and the change in the interest rate ( Int  ) are included to 
control for cross-country differences in the aggregate level of household leverage and 
monetary conditions, respectively.
15 Unobservable economy-specific effects and the 
remainder disturbance are captured by  i   and  it   (with zero mean and constant 
variance
2
  ), respectively. 
We hypothesise that LTV policy reduces the responsiveness of mortgage default risk to 
changes in property prices. This implies that the estimated coefficients of  LTV I P    and 
NLTV I P    ( 1  and 2  , respectively) should be negative, with the absolute value of  1  lower 
than that of 2  . Similarly, we hypothesise that mortgage default risk is less responsive to 
macroeconomic fluctuations in economies with LTV policies than in those without them. 
Therefore, we expect estimates for  3  and 4   to be negative, and the absolute value of the 
former to be smaller than that of the latter. The sign of the estimated coefficient of DTGDP 
( 5  ) is expected to be positive; greater aggregate household leverage generally indicates 
higher default risk when other factors are kept constant. A positive estimate of  6  is expected 
because a higher interest rate implies a higher debt servicing burden for mortgagors.  
                                                  
14  Throughout this study, changes are measured from quarter to quarter.  
15  Other institutional factors such as recourse rules and personal bankruptcy regulations are likely to affect 
mortgage defaults. The effect of such factors on the mortgage delinquency ratio is assumed to be captured by 
the fixed-effect coefficients of the countries. 170  BIS Papers No 57
 
Model B: 
Model B, a modification of Model A with an additional dummy variable  i J  included, examines 
whether MIPs reduce the effectiveness of LTV policy.  i J  is defined as 1 if an MIP is in place 
and zero otherwise. The inclusion of the additional dummy variable allows us to examine 
whether the coefficient estimates of the economies with both an LTV policy and an MIP are 
statistically different from those for economies with only an LTV policy. The model is 
specified as follows:  
t i i t i t i
NLTV t i LTV t i i
NLTV t i LTV t i i t i
  Int DTGDP
I GDP I GDP J
I P I P J MD
i i
i i
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 (2) 
where  i   and  it   (with zero mean and constant variance
2
  ) capture economy-specific 
effects and remainder disturbance, respectively. Note that there are two new coefficients, 
1  and  3  , in Model B as compared to Model A.  1  is the incremental sensitivity of the 
mortgage delinquency ratio to property prices in the economies with both LTV policy and an 
MIP relative to the economies with only LTV policy. Similarly,  3  measures the corresponding 
incremental sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations. The other estimated coefficients can 
be interpreted in exactly the same way as those in Model A. 
Our core interest is in the estimated value and statistical significance of  1   and  3  . A 
positive and significant estimate of  1  ( 3  ) would indicate that MIPs increase the sensitivity of 
the mortgage delinquency ratio to property prices (macroeconomic fluctuations), suggesting 
that MIPs reduce the effectiveness of LTV policy. 
Data for estimations and the estimation method 
The estimation sample consists of unbalanced quarterly panel data for the 13 economies 
from Q1 1991 to Q2 2010. The main descriptive statistics for the data are shown in Table 1. 
Data on the mortgage delinquency ratio are collected from the respective central banks,
16,17 
whereas data on property prices, GDP, government bond yields (which are used to proxy for 
interest rates) and the GDP deflator are taken from various databases, including the BIS, 
CEIC and IMF (ie International Financial Statistics) databases. Real property prices and real 
interest rates are derived from the respective nominal variables and the GDP deflator. 
Of the 13 economies, four – Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore – have adopted an 
LTV policy according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS (2010)) and information 
obtained from their respective central banks/supervisory authorities. Hong Kong, Korea and 
Malaysia have also implemented MIPs.
18 
                                                  
16  The UK data, which are obtained from the Council of Mortgage Lenders, the trade association of the United 
Kingdom’s mortgage industry, are the only exception.  
17  Mortgage delinquency data for Greece and the United Kingdom are available annually and biannually, 
respectively. Quarterly data for these two countries are derived by interpolating the annual/biannual series. 
We verified that the empirical results are not sensitive to the interpolation method used. 
18  The corresponding institutions are the HKMC, the Korea Housing Finance Corporation and Cagamas Berhad, 
respectively. Cagamas Berhad launched Malaysia’s MIP in 2008.   
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Models A and B are estimated using the generalised least squares (GLS) method instead of 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) method because, in theory, GLS estimates are more 
efficient than OLS estimates given the panel structure of the dataset.
19 
Estimation results 
We first discuss the estimation results for Model A, which are summarised in Table 2. The 
estimated sensitivity of the mortgage delinquency ratio to property prices is negative and 
lower (in absolute terms) in economies with LTV policies (1) than in economies without LTV 
policies (2). A 1% drop in property prices would increase the delinquency ratio by 0.35 basis 
points in economies with LTV policies, and by 1.29 basis points in economies without LTV 
policies. The statistical results of the Wald test indicate that the null hypothesis of 1 = 2 can 
be rejected at the 10% significance level for Model A, suggesting that LTV policy reduces the 
vulnerability of banking systems to property price shocks. 
Moreover, mortgage default risk is estimated to be less responsive to macroeconomic 
fluctuations (3) in economies with LTV policies than in those without LTV policies (4). All 
things being equal, a 1 percentage point decrease in GDP growth should raise the 
delinquency ratio by 3 basis points in economies with LTV policies compared with 5.1 basis 
points in those without LTV policies. The statistical results for the Wald test, however, 
suggest that the difference is not significant statistically. 
The estimation results for Model B are similar to those for Model A. In addition, the estimated 
coefficients  1   and  3   are found to be statistically insignificant, suggesting that MIPs have 
not reduced the effectiveness of LTV policy. 
                                                  
19  In panel datasets, variance in cross-sectional units may be significantly different. The OLS estimation is 
statistically inefficient and can give misleading inference when variances in the data are unequal.  172  BIS Papers No 57
 
Table 1 





In per cent  
Real property 
price growth 
In per cent 
Debt-to-GDP 
ratio 
In per cent 
Real GDP 
growth 
In per cent 
Change in real 
interest rates 
In per cent 
Period 
Economies  Mean  Std dev  Mean  Std dev Mean  Std dev Mean Std dev Mean  Std dev   
Australia  0.011 0.037  1.239  2.68  37.703  6.16 1.239 2.68  –0.075  0.930  2002–10
Canada  0.009 0.02  1.061  2.068 51.479  5.69 1.061 2.068  –0.087  1.530  2004–09
Greece  0.018 0.352  0.343  1.604 23.918  7.299 0.343 1.604  0.018  0.922  2003–09
Hong Kong SAR  –0.006 0.093  0.315  6.126 47.29 6.597 0.315 6.126  0.002  1.847  1998–10
Korea  –0.067 0.114  0.638  3.034 22.43 1.568 0.638 3.034  –0.014  3.152  2005–09
Malaysia  –0.198 0.478  –0.122  2.372 17.401  5.011  –
0.122 2.372 0.047  3.089  1999–09
Philippines  –0.113 0.495  1.848  3.397 2.069  0.127 1.848 3.397  1.497  4.318  2008–10
Portugal  0.007 0.072  –0.106  0.658 55.525  6.324  –
0.106 0.658 0.061  0.756  2003–10
Singapore  –0.061 0.141  1.007  5.361 31.373  1.983 1.007 5.361  –0.030  4.742  2004–09
Spain  –0.012 0.179  0.89 2.508 38.23  16.623 0.89 2.508  –0.107  1.223  1995–09
Thailand  –0.435 2.382  –0.108  2.834 16.329  1.849  –
0.108 2.834 –0.254 3.498 2001–10
United Kingdom  –0.025 0.129  1.375  2.606 67.756  10.176 1.375 2.606  –0.079  0.925  1995–09
United States   0.106 0.381  0.346  1.096 54.258  11.898 0.346 1.096  –0.052  0.435 1991–
2010 
All economies  –0.043 0.697  0.596  3.12  40.197  19.522 0.596 3.12  –0.027  2.126 1991–
2010 
Note: Std dev denotes standard deviation. 
  




Estimation results for Model A (equation 1) and Model B (equation 2) 
Change in mortgage delinquency ratio ( MD  )  Dependent variable: 
Model A  Model B 
Constant  ) ( 0    –0.2013** –0.2003** 
P      
 with LTV policy ) ( 1    –0.0035* –0.0021** 
 without LTV policy ) ( 2    –0.0129** –0.0129** 
 Incremental effect of MIP  ) ( 1    . –0.0016 
GDP      
 with LTV policy ) ( 3    –0.0303** –0.0487* 
 without LTV policy ) ( 4    –0.0508** –0.0506** 
 Incremental effect of MIP  ) ( 3    . 0.0228 
DTGDP  ) ( 5     0.0051**   0.0051** 
Int  ) ( 6    0.0022 0.0024 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2460  0.2435 














Note: ** and * denote the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
A simulation exercise 
To further visualise the effect of LTV policy on banking stability, we conduct a simulation 
exercise for Hong Kong’s banking sector in which we estimate the degree to which relaxing 
the maximum 70% LTV ratio for property lending might generate losses in the banking sector 
in the wake of a severe property price shock. To this end, we consider a hypothetical 
scenario in which the 70% LTV policy was abandoned some time before 1997. We also 
assume that all banks aggressively exploited this policy change, expanding their business by 
extending mortgage loans that covered 90% of the value of a property (ie with an average 
LTV ratio of 90%). We then assume a 40% drop in real property prices.
20 With the assumed 
                                                  
20  The shock is comparable to one that occurred in Hong Kong between Q4 1997 and Q3 1998. 174  BIS Papers No 57
 
shock, we simulate the movement of other variables (ie GDP,  Int  and DTGDP) based on 
their historical relationships.
21 Together with the estimated coefficients 2  , 4  , 5   and 6  in 
Model A, we compute the overall impact of the shock on the delinquency ratio. We repeat the 
process 100,000 times to generate a distribution of the delinquency ratio. For comparison, 
another distribution that assumes an initial LTV ratio of 70% is also simulated. The 
distribution is simulated based on the estimated coefficients 1  , 3  , 5   and 6  in Model A. 
These two simulated distributions are shown in Graph 3. We find that if the 70% guideline 
had been relaxed before 1997, the delinquency ratio would have increased from 0.6% to 
1.71% (at the 95% confidence level) after the 40% decline in property prices. In contrast, with 
the 70% LTV policy in place, the delinquency ratio would have increased only moderately, to 
1.11%. This result is largely consistent with the empirical findings of Wong et al (2004). 
Based on the volume of RML and total capital in Hong Kong’s banking sector in 1997, we 
compute the credit losses based on the simulation results (Table 3). The calculation of credit 
losses takes into account the effect of the drop in property prices on the loss given default. 
Based on the tail risk, we find that, if the maximum LTV ratio is increased to 90%, the credit 
loss would come to about 1.87% of total capital (at the 95% confidence level), compared with 
0.46% for the actual maximum LTV ratio of 70%. 
 
Graph 3 
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21  We follow the simulation method adopted by Wong et al (2008). The model consists of a seemingly unrelated 
regression for the GDP growth rate, interest rates and real property prices. For the variable DTGDP, the value 
is simulated based on the simulated GDP growth rate and an initial value of 50% of DTGDP.  




Simulated credit losses with maximum LTV ratios of 70% and 90% 
 
In millions of Hong 
Kong dollars 
As a percentage of 
total capital 
 As a percentage of 
Tier 1 capital 
Statistics  LTV 70%  LTV 90%  LTV 70%  LTV 90%   LTV 70%  LTV 90% 
Mean  998.79   3991.05   0.3579   1.4300   0.4550   1.8183  
50th percentile  1159.45   4681.32   0.4154   1.6774   0.5282   2.1327  
90th percentile  1204.70   4876.01   0.4317   1.7471   0.5488   2.2214  
95th percentile  1286.65   5226.50   0.4610   1.8727   0.5862   2.3811  
99th percentile  1382.15   5631.18   0.4952   2.0177   0.6297   2.5655  
Note: LTV 70% refers to the actual policy capping the maximum ratio at 70%, whereas LTV 90% refers to the 
hypothetical maximum ratio of 90%. 
 




History of Hong Kong’s LTV policy 
Year Major  developments 
Before 1991  "Residential mortgage" was defined in the Third Schedule of the Banking Ordinance 
as a mortgage where, among other things, "the principal sum does not exceed 90% 
of the purchase price or the market value of the property, whichever amount is the 
lower". 
1991  The maximum LTV ratio of 70% was adopted by the banking industry in November 
1991 and has since been fully endorsed by the Commissioner of Banking as a 
prudential measure against overexposure to the property market. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/viewpt/20090604e.htm. 
1994  A guideline was introduced at the beginning of 1994 when property lending was 
rising rapidly. It advised AIs whose exposure to property markets exceeded 40% of 
their loans to local borrowers (the average for the industry as a whole) that they 
should seek to stabilise or reduce that percentage. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/1998/980728e2.htm. 
1995  The Hong Kong Government confirmed at a Legislative Council meeting that the 
maximum 70% LTV ratio should be adopted as a long-term regulatory policy. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/viewpt/20090604e.htm. 
1997  The HKMA recommended that a maximum LTV of 60% should be adopted for luxury 
properties with a value of more than HK$ 12 million. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/guide_no/guide_593b.htm. 
AIs were required to have a clearly defined and documented policy with respect to 
assessing the ability of residential mortgage borrowers to repay their loans, including 
a debt servicing ratio test. The debt servicing ratio, defined as the monthly 
repayment obligations of the borrower as a percentage of monthly income, was set 
at 50–60% (the upper end of the range was confined to high-income households). 
See www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/guide_no/guide_594b.htm. 
1998  The 40% guideline for AIs was abandoned. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/guide_no/guide_595b.htm. 
2001  While the HKMA believed that the 70% LTV guideline remained generally 
appropriate as a long-term prudential measure, and the guideline continued to be 
applied to new RML, the HKMA did not object if AIs chose to depart from the 70% 
LTV guideline when refinancing the mortgage loans of borrowers with negative 
equity, so long as such loans did not exceed 100% of the current market value of the 
mortgaged property.  
The 60% LTV guideline for the purchase of luxury properties with a value of more 
than HK$ 12 million was abandoned and the maximum LTV ratio for such loans was 
restored to 70%. See www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/circu_date/20011010a.htm.  
Oct 2009  AIs were required to reduce the maximum LTV ratio for properties with a value of 
HK$ 20 million or more from 70% to 60%. See 
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/circu_date/20091023e1.htm.   
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Year  Major developments (cont) 
Aug 2010  The HKMA implemented additional prudential measures for RML, as follows: 
Applying a maximum LTV ratio of 60% to properties with a value of at least 
HK$ 12 million. For properties valued below $12 million, the 70% LTV guideline 
continued to apply, but the maximum loan amount was capped at HK$ 7.2 million; 
Requiring banks to ask mortgage applicants whether they intended to occupy the 
mortgage property and lowering the maximum LTV ratio to 60% for non-owner-
occupied properties; and 
Reducing the 50–60% range for the debt servicing ratio of mortgage applicants to 
50%. Requiring banks to stress-test mortgage applicants' repayment ability assuming 
an increase in interest rates of at least two percentage points, and capping stressed 
debt servicing ratios at 60%.  
See www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2010/20100813e7.htm. 
Nov 2010  To strengthen risk management in RML, the HKMA implemented the following 
measures:  
Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for properties with a value of at least 
HK$ 12 million from 60% to 50%;  
Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for residential properties with a value between 
HK$ 8 million and HK$ 12 million from 70% to 60%, and capping the maximum loan 
amount at HK$ 6 million;  
Maintaining the 70% maximum LTV ratio for residential properties with a value below 
HK$ 8 million, but capping the maximum loan amount at HK$ 4.8 million; and  
Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for all non-owner-occupied residential properties, 
properties held by a company, and industrial and commercial properties to 50%, 
regardless of the value of said properties. 
See www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2010/20101119e5.htm. 
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